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I. THE ACTUAL LE'ITER1 2 
~uprenre <llourt of tqe ;llinite~ ~httes 
;1lllb:sqingfon, gi.<ll. 20543 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE April 22, 1993 
Dear Mr. Speaker: 
[Vol. 46 
By direction of the Supreme Court of the United States, I have the 
honor to submit to the Congress amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure that have been adopted by the Supreme Court pursuant to Sec-
tion 2072 of Title 28, United States Code. While the Court is satisfied that 
the required procedures have been observed, this transmittal does not 
necessarily indicate that the Court itself would have proposed these 
amendments in the form submitted. 
Justice White has issued a separate statement. Justice Scalia has issued 
a dissenting statement, which Justice Thomas joins and Justice Souter 
joins in part. 
Accompanying these rules are excerpts from the report of the Judicial 
Conference of the United States containing the Advisory Committee Notes 
submitted to the Court for its consideration pursuant to Section 331 of 
Title 28, United States Code. 
I. Editor's Note: THE AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND FORMS 
were originally published in a House Document at H.R. Doc. No. 74, 103d Cong., !st Sess. 98 
(1993). The House Document appears in its entirety at AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE, 146 F.R.D. 401. The Florida Law Re1•iew has elected to cite to Federal Rules Decisions 
for the sake of efficiency. The reprinted in form is used throughout the symposium issue to refer to 
the original publication of the material in House Document form, however. the citation to H.R. Doc. 
No. 74 will appear only in the initial citation to the amendments in each article. Thereafter, the cita· 
tion will be to AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 146 F.R.D. 401. As a final 
note, portions of the material are also in the Interim Edition of the I 14th volume of the Supreme Court 
Reporter. 
2. Letter from William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, to 
Thomas S. Foley, Speaker of the House of Representatives (Apr. 22, 1993), in H.R. Doc. No. 74, 
103d Cong., !st Sess. 98 (1993), reprinted in AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE, 146 F.R.D. 401, 403 (1993) [hereinafter AMENDMENTS]. This is the letter in which Chief 
Justice Rehnquist transmitted to Congress amendments to various Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
which became effective on December I, 1993. Id. at 401 (giving notice that the amendments to the 
Federal Rules, including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, became effective December I, 1993). 
Congress did not act; however, I wrote the translation of the letter below immediately after the Court 
transmitted the package of amendments and before Congress completed consideration of it. The Su· 
preme Court is empowered to develop rules of procedure for the district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 
(1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
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Sincerely, 
William H. Rehnquist 
Honorable Thomas S. Foley 
Speaker of the House of Representatives 
Washington, D.C. 20515 
II. THE TRANSLATION3 
A. Introduction 
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The Chief Justice transmits to Congress the following amendments to 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in accordance with Section 2074 of 
Title 28 of the United States Code.4 These revisions constitute the most 
ambitious package of amendments to the Federal Rules in their half-centu-
ry history. The three-year revision process under which the Supreme Court 
adopted these amendments is the first important test of new revision pro-
cedures that Congress instituted in 1988 to increase public scrutiny of and 
to improve the revision process.5 
The Court emphasizes the changes in Rule 11 governing sanctions and 
the amendment of Rule 26 covering discovery, the latter concentrating on 
mandatory or automatic prediscovery disclosure. The Court focuses on 
revised Rule 11 because its 1983 amendment has proven to be the most 
controversial revision of the civil rules ever promulgated.6 The Court 
focuses on revised Rule 26 because numerous complications that attend 
discovery seriously threaten the civil justice system.7 Moreover, the 
3. This is my translation of what the letter did not say, but what I interpret to have actually 
happened in the rule revision process. 
4. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
5. See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, §§ 2071-2074, 
2077, 102 Stat. 4642, 4648-50 (1988) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2074, 2077 (1988 & 
Supp. V 1993)). See generally Harold S. Lewis, The Excessive History of Federal Rule IS(c) and Its 
Lessons for Civil Rules Revision, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1507 (1987) (providing background on the Federal 
Rules revision process); Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery 
and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REv. 795 (1991) (same and predicting increased 
politicization of the Federal Rules revision process as a result of increased public participation). 
6. See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Civil Rights Plaintiffs and the Proposed Revision of Rule 11, 11 IOWA 
L. REV. 1775, 1775 (1992); Laurens Walker, A Comprehensive Reform for Federal Civil Rulemaking, 
61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 455, 455-59 (1993). 
7. See, e.g., COMMITTEE ON DISCOVERY, NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION ON 
COMMERCIAL AND FEDERAL LmGATION, REPORT ON DISCOVERY UNDER RULE 26(b)(l), reprinted in 
127 F.R.D. 625 (1990); Maurice Rosenberg & Warren R. King, Curbing Discovery Abuse in Litiga-
tion: Enough Is Enough, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REY. 579, 586-87; Ralph K. Winter, Jn Defense of Discovery 
Reform, 58 BROOK. L. REY. 263, 263-64 (1992). 
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amendment prescribing automatic disclosure may prove to be the most 
controversial formal proposal to modify the Federal Rules in their histo-
ry. 8 In short, because sanctions and discovery are critical to federal civil 
litigation, analysis of the Rule 11 and Rule 26 revisions and of the rule 
amendment process affords instructive insights on modern civil procedure. 
B. Specific Amendments 
1. Amended Rule 11 
The Rule 11 revision process was replete with ironies.9 The Advisory 
Committee on the Civil Rules (Advisory Committee) issued a preliminary 
draft proposal to amend Rule 11 only eight years after Rule 11 's signifi-
cant revision. 10 This time frame constituted a substantially shorter period 
for testing an amendment's efficacy than the one generation time frame 
prescribed by knowledgeable experts including Judge Benjamin Kaplan 
and Professor Arthur Miller, two former Advisory Committee Report-
ers. 11 Unfortunately, the preliminary draft failed to address many of the 
complications that plagued the 1983 alteration of Rule 11. 
The Advisory Committee based its decision to propose revision partly 
on the perception that the 1983 provision was "unduly discouraging vigor-
ous advocacy on behalf of particular parties, especially civil rights plain-
tiffs."12 The reality may have been that Rule 11 was disadvantaging civil 
8. See Carl Tobias, Improving the 1988 and 1990 Judicial Improvements Acts. 46 STAN. L. 
REV. 1589, 1611-12 (1994) [hereinafter Tobias, lmproi·ing]; Carl Tobias. Rule II and Civil Rights 
Litigation. 37 BUFF. L. REV. 485. 485-86 & n.2 (1988/89) (asserting 1983 Rule 11 amendment was 
most controversial revision ever adopted) [hereinafter Tobias, Rule 1 l]; supra note 6 and accompany-
ing text (same). 
9. Carl Tobias, Reconsidering Rule 11, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 855, 864-905 (1992) [hereinafter 
Tobias, Reconsidering]; Carl Tobias, Rule Revision Roundelay. 1992 WIS. L. REV. 236, 236-38 [here-
inafter Tobias. Roundelay). 
10. COMMITfEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE 
UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE (1991). reprinted in 137 F.R.D. 53 (1991) 
[hereinafter PRELIMINARY DRAFT). 
11. See Marvin E. Frankel, Some Preliminary Obsen•ations Concerning Civil Rule 23. 43 F.R.D. 
39, 52 (1967) (citing Kaplan's view of a one generation time period for evaluating the Federal Rules); 
Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the "Class Action 
Problem," 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 677 (1979) (providing Miller's similar view); Arthur R. Miller, The 
New Certification Standard Under Rule II. 130 F.R.D. 479, 505-06 (1990) (observing that the Rules 
were revised without allowing for sufficient time to measure their adequacy). 
12. Tobias, Roundelay, supra note 9. at 326; see also PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note IO. at 64. 
79 (stating that one purpose of rule change is to "equalize the burdens" between plaintiffs and defen-
dants); Tobias, Reconsidering, supra note 9. at 862 (observing that members of the public criticized 
the 1983 version of Rule 11 as having a chilling effect upon civil rights litigation); Georgene M. 
Vairo. Rule 11: Where We Are and Where We Are Going. 60 FORD. L. REV. 475, 484-85 (1991) (ar-
guing that defendants in civil rights actions often use Rule 11 to attack civil rights plaintiffs unfairly). 
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rights plaintiffs less than numerous such plaintiffs and their counsel had 
argued, according to a 1991 Federal Judicial Center (FJC) Rule 11 study 
commissioned by the Advisory Committee.13 Thus, while the Advisory 
Committee admirably commissioned the study, the Committee appeared to 
rely rather selectively on its findings. Such selective reliance might have 
been appropriate because Rule 11 has been studied extensively, producing 
a veritable "cottage industry" of seven major assessments and hundreds of 
law review articles, some of which have yielded controversial or conflict-
ing conclusions.14 
In the final analysis, however, the Advisory Committee's decision to 
premise proposed amendment of Rule 11 on the perception that the rule 
unduly discouraged zealous representation of civil rights plaintiffs and 
other litigants may actually have been correct.15 The most comprehensive 
Rule 11 study, conducted under the auspices of the American Judicature 
Society, showed that judges have sanctioned civil rights plaintiffs as fre-
quently as any other category of federal court litigants.16 Furthermore, the 
study asserted that the 1983 version of Rule 11 prompted civil rights 
lawyers to advise clients to abandon potentially legitimate cases.17 
In an important component of the 1991 FJC study, the FJC circulated 
a questionnaire to every federal district judge.18 Although four-fifths of 
the judges who responded thought that the 1983 revision of Rule 11 
should be retained, 19 a like percentage believed that groundless litigation, 
the reduction of which was a major reason for the 1983 amendment, posed 
minor difficulty.20 The trial bench was also evenly divided over whether 
·groundless lawsuits had increased since 1983.21 Moreover, a majority of 
But see Tobias, Reconsidering, supra note 9, at 864-65 (citing studies which stated that Rule 11 "was 
not as problematic as many civil rights plaintiffs and attorneys had contended"). 
13. See ELIZABETH C. WIGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CI'R., The Federal Judicial Center's 
Study of Rule 11, in FJC DIRECTIONS 3, 3-4 (1991); Tobias, Reconsidering, supra note 9, at 864-65. 
14. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Transfonnation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of 
Rule I I, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1930 (1989) (producing a cottage industry of studies yielding con-
troversial or conflicting conclusions); Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bath Water: The Prospects 
for Procedural Progress, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 761, 796 (1993) (same). See generally Vairo, supra note 
12, at 476, 478-82 (documenting studies and articles and discussing the Rule 11 "cottage industry"). 
15. See Lawrence C. Marshall et al., The Use and Impact of Rule II, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 943, 
966-73 (1992). See generally Herbert M. Kritzer & Frances K. Zemans, Local Legal Culture and 
Control of Litigation, 27 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 535, 536-37, 539-49 (1993) (discussing Advisory 
Committee's rationale for amendment and studying the effects of Rule 11 on "local legal culture"). 
16. See Marshall et al., supra note 15, at 966-73. 
17. See id. at 971. 
18. Tobias, Reconsidering, supra note 9, at 863. 
19. ELIZABETH C. WIGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CI'R., Judicial Assessment of Rule 11: ]ts 
Effectiveness and Its Impact on Litigation in Federal Coun, in FJC DIRECTIONS, supra note 13, at 33-
35. 
20. See id. at 29-30. 
21. Id. at 29. 
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the judges found that prompt resolution of motions to dismiss and motions 
for summary judgment as well as use of pretrial conferences, Rule 26 and 
Rule 37 sanctions, and informal warnings were more effective in disposing 
of groundless cases than Rule 11.22 
Another irony of the recent Rule 11 amendment was that the Advisory 
Committee's work on the preliminary draft proposal to revise Rule 11 
apparently pleased few of the interested constituencies which the proposal 
would have affected.23 For instance, the imposition of a continuing duty 
to withdraw tiny portions of papers when they cease being meritorious and 
the prospect of having to pay substantial financial sanctions for violating 
the rule troubled resource-poor litigants.24 The defense bar was bothered 
by specific inclusion of denials as components of papers that must satisfy 
Rule 11 and by the decreased likelihood of recovering attorneys' fees for 
Rule 11 violations.25 Latent ambiguities in the draft's language relating, 
for instance, to the calculation of proper sanctions and attorneys' fees con-
cerned numerous lawyers and parties who participate in federal civil litiga-
tion.26 The Advisory Committee thoroughly studied the 1983 amendment, 
solicited and seriously considered public input before proposing an amend-
ment,27 and carefully prepared a draft which it believed would be accept-
able to all affected interests.28 
The Advisory Committee's preliminary draft of the Rule 11 revision 
was published together with a counter-proposal written by judges and 
other distinguished members of the American legal community in the 
same Federal Rules Decisions advance sheets.29 This counter-proposal to 
the Advisory Committee's draft suggested, for example, the deletion of 
any continuing duty to amend pleadings and the proscription of attorney 
22. Id. at 29-30; see also Carl Tobias, Judicial Discretion and the 1983 Amendments to the Fed-
eral Civil Rules, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 933, 958-59 (1991) (discussing Rule 26 and Rule 37 sanctions). 
23. See generally Tobias, Rule 11, supra note 8, at 498-501 (discussing the hardship created by a 
party's limited financial resources in civil rights cases); Vairo, supra note 12, at 483-85 (discussing the 
chilling effect and satellite litigation problems inherent in Rule 11 ). 
24. See Tobias, Roundelay, supra note 9, at 237. 
25. See id. See generally Vairo, supra note 12, at 495-500 (criticizing the Advisory Committee's 
major revisions to Rule 11 ). 
26. See Tobias, Reconsidering, supra note 9, at 894-95; Tobias, Roundelay, supra note 9, at 238. 
27. COMMITTEE ON RULES AND PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF 
THE UNITED STATES, CALL FOR WRITTEN COMMENTS ON RULE 11 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE AND RELATED RULES (1990), reprimed in 131 F.R.D. 335, 345 (1990) (hereinafter CALL 
FOR COMMENTS); Tobias, Reconsidering, supra note 9, at 861-65. 
28. See, e.g., Tobias, Reconsidering, supra note 9, at 893-905; Vairo, supra note 12, at 495-500. 
29. See PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 10, at 75; A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM ET AL., BENCH-BAR 
PROPOSAL TO REVISE CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 11, reprimed in 137 F.R.D. 159, 159 (1991). The coun-
ter-proposal was formulated by a group of distinguished members of the legal community, including 
Judges Leon and Patrick Higginbotham, former Advisory Committee member John Frank, and former 
president of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America Bill Wagner. Id. 
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fee awards as sanctions.Jo The plaintiffs public interest and civil rights 
bars found this counter-proposal considerably more palatable.J1 
The Advisory Committee developed additional iterations of the prelim-
inary draft, so that the final document submitted by the Committee during 
May 1992 to the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Evidence 
and Procedure (Standing Committee) ironically resembled the counter-
proposal in several respects.J2 Although the counter-proposal may have 
influenced the Advisory Committee, and members of the group sponsoring 
it might claim such credit, the Advisory Committee would probably have 
reached the same result without the group's prompting and without the 
group making certain Committee members feel unduly pressured.JJ , 
The changes in the preliminary draft were apparently attributable to 
the Advisory Committee's conscientious efforts to solicit and review con-
siderable written public comment,34 to hear testimony at three public 
hearings,J5 and to rethink and rewrite numerous aspects of the prelimi-
nary draft.J6 These endeavors enabled the Advisory Committee to craft 
the fairest, clearest, most efficacious revision possible.J7 Indeed, the Ad-
visory Committee's work in assembling the final proposal to amend Rule 
11 closely approximates the type of reasoned decisionmaking and open, 
responsive rule revision process that Congress envisioned when it recently 
modified the rule amendment procedures.J8 
Notwithstanding the Advisory Committee's prodigious efforts and the 
significant improvements in the proposed revision of Rule 11, some ob-
servers continued to oppose the changes recommended.J9 Justice Antonin 
Scalia, who pens an acerbic dissent to the Court's transmittal of amended 
30. HIGGINBOTIIAM ET AL., supra note 29, at 165-70. 
31. The assertion regarding palatability is premised on my personal conversations with numerous 
members of these bars. 
32. See supra note 24 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying note 72 (asserting that the 
Advisory Committee omitted several of the Rule 11 requirements from the Preliminary Draft). Com-
pare EXCERPT FROM THE REPoRT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITl'EE ON RULES OF PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE SEPI'EMBER 1992, reprinted in AMENDMENTS, supra note 2, at 577-83, 585-86 (lim-
iting the duty to correct papers that include unsupported factual allegations) with HIGGINBOTIIAM ET 
AL., supra note 29, at 165-66 (suggesting that the continuing duty to withdraw non-meritorious claims 
in court documents be circumscribed). 
33. This is premised on my assessment of the Advisory Committee's work and on my personal 
conversations with several individuals who are knowledgeable about the Committee's work. See gener-
ally Tobias, supra note 6, at 1789-93 (analyzing the Standing Committee's draft). 
34. See Carl Tobias, The 1993 Revision of Federal Rule 11, 10 IND. LJ. 171, 176-85 (1994). 
35. See Tobias, Reconsidering, supra note 9, at 859-65. 
36. See supra note 32 and accompanying texL 
37. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text. 
38. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. See generally Walker, supra note 6, at 457 (sug-
gesting reforms for improving federal civil rule revision). 
39. See Tobias, supra note 34, at 186-87. 
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Rule 11,40 is perhaps the amendment's most prominent critic.41 He con-
tends that adoption of the Rule 11 revision would "eliminate a significant 
and necessary deterrent to frivolous litigation."42 Justice Scalia argues 
that the amendment will make Rule 11 "toothless," because it accords 
judges discretion to levy sanctions, disfavors compensation for litigation 
costs, and provides safe harbors which would enable parties who contra-
vene Rule 11 to avoid sanctions altogether.43 
Justice Scalia claims that safe harbors are overly solicitous of attor-
neys and litigants who abuse the litigation process, permitting them to 
"file thoughtless, reckless, and harassing pleadings, secure in the knowl-
edge that they have nothing to lose" because they can withdraw the of-
fending papers upon notification.44 He criticizes the proposal for entrust-
ing sanctions to judicial discretion, remarking that courts will not punish 
offenders unless required to do so.45 Moreover, Justice Scalia warns that 
restrictions on sanctioning for compensatory purposes will reduce "the 
likelihood that frivolousness will even be challenged" by decreasing the 
incentives of those who can best alert judges to perversion of the litigation 
process.46 
Despite his criticisms, Justice Scalia states that he would not have 
dissented had there been convincing evidence that the 1983 "Rule 11 
regime [was] ineffective, or encourage[d] excessive satellite litigation."47 
Justice Scalia relies upon the judicial responses to the FJC survey for the 
idea that the federal bench generally agrees that the current 1983 version 
of Rule 11 essentially works.48 The responses suggest that trial judges, 
who face litigation abuse daily, overwhelmingly favor the 1983 provision 
and these responses persuade Justice Scalia that the Court should not gut 
the rule through the proposed amendment.49 
However, Justice Scalia does not mention that the relative inability of 
the 1983 Rule 11 to prevent frivolous litigation and the rule's promotion 
of satellite litigation were apparently two important reasons for the Advi-
sory Committee's proposed revision.50 Justice Scalia rather selectively 
40. See Dissenting Statement of Justice Scalia, reprinted in AMENDMENTS, supra note 2, at 507-
13 (explaining why Justice Scalia dissented from the transmittal of the amendments to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure). 
41. Id. at 507. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 507-08. 
44. Id. at 508. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 508-09. 
47. Id. at 509. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 509-10. 
50. See Letter from Judge Sam C. Pointer, Jr .. Chairman, Advisory Committee, to Judge Robert 
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invokes the survey results by not mentioning the survey replies whic.h 
showed that eighty percent of the federal district bench thinks that ground-
less litigation is a minor problem.s1 Justice Scalia correspondingly ne-
glected to mention that a majority of federal judges find numerous pro-
cedures other than Rule 11 more effective in thwarting groundless law-
suits.s2 Moreover, if the trial bench favored the 1983 Rule as much as 
Justice Scalia suggests,s3 the bench could well have insured the 1983 
version's retention because every entity in the rule revision hierarchy 
respects and defers to those federal judges' perspectives on civil rules 
modification.54 In any event, the rule revision entities, whose membership 
consists primarily of federal judges, seemingly concluded that a stricter 
amendment's potential disadvantages, such as satellite litigation and chill-
ing effects, outweighed its benefits, namely deterrence of frivolous cas-
es.ss 
Indeed, the federal judiciary's support for changing Rule 11 would 
apparently suffice for Representative William J. Hughes (D.-N.J.), who 
chairs the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Intellectual Property and 
Judicial Administration.s6 This subcommittee has the responsibility for 
overseeing revision of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.57 Even 
though Hughes harbors reservations about certain aspects of the amend-
ment, the subcommittee chair will probably defer to the federal bench 
because he finds broad support for the revision and for curtailing "the 
E. Keeton, Chairman, Standing Committee, Attach. B (May l, 1992), reprinted in AMENDMENTS, 
supra note 2, at 523-24; Tobias, supra note 34, at 174, 177 & n.49, 178 n.51, 179 & n.62. See gener-
ally supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text (discussing the issue of groundless litigation in the Rule 
11 amendment process). 
51. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text. 
52. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
53. Dissenting Statement of Justice Scalia, reprinted in AMENDMENTS, supra note 2, at 509-10 
("But the overwhelming approval of the Rule by the federal district judges who daily grapple with the 
problem of litigation abuse is enough to persuade me that it should not be gutted as the proposed 
revision suggests."). 
54. See S. 2212, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (bill requiring that rule revision committees "have 
a majority of members of the practicing bar"); Laura A. Kaster & Kenneth A. Wittenberg, Rulemakers 
Should Be Litigators, NAT'L LJ., Aug. 17, 1992, at 15, 16, available in WESTLAW, NLJ Database 
(suggesting that fewer judges and more litigators serve as rulemakers because judges control the rule 
revision process); John P. Frank, Rule 11-The Need to Start Over 15 (May 1, 1992) (same) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with the Florida Law Review). These entities are the Advisory Committee, 
the Standing Committee, the Judicial Conference, and the Supreme Court. Id. at 14-15. 
55. See Tobias, supra note 34, at 178 & n.53. 
56. A Laok at the New Committee Lineups in the 103d Congress, THE THIRD BRANCH, Feb. 
1993, at 6. Senator Howell T. Heflin (D.-Ala.) chairs the Senate analogue, the Subcommittee on 
Courts and Administrative Practice. Id. 
57. Federal Courts: Bill to Delete Discovery Rule Reported to House Committee, Daily Rep. for 
Executives (Regulation, Economics and Law) (BNA), Aug. 6, 1993, available in WESTLAW, BNA-
DER Database. 
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explosion of satellite litigation" which the 1983 version of Rule 11 has 
fostered.58 Other members of the House of Representatives and of the 
Senate, however, have evinced less deference to the federal bench. The 
members' lack of deference is manifested by their introduction of several 
bills that would postpone the amendment's effective date for a year.59 
Congress will experience considerable difficulty attempting to improve 
on many components of the amended Rule 11. The modifications repre-
sent the well-considered judgment of the rule revision entities and their 
expert advisors.60 The amendment concomitantly constitutes the most 
efficacious means of addressing the broad range of factual situations 
which Rule 11 implicates. For instance, the amended Rule 11 employs 
terms such as "reasonable" and "likely."61 These terms are the clearest 
and fairest terminology for treating the inherently fact-specific issues that 
motions to sanction raise. 62 
Congress also will encounter problems attempting to enhance even 
those remaining aspects of the rule revision which could be improved. For 
example, two potentially troublesome components are the Advisory 
Committee's use of the adjective "nonfrivolous" to describe acceptable 
legal arguments63 and the Committee's use of the words "appropriate 
sanctions" to delineate the assessments that courts may award.64 Use of 
these terms will foster inconsistent application and satellite litigation.65 
Retaining the 1983 Rule's phrase, "good faith," rather than substituting 
"nonfrivolous," and additionally circumscribing judicial discretion to sanc-
tion, would remedy or ameliorate these complications.66 Nonetheless, 
Congress will encounter the greatest resistance to modifying these changes 
because they represent the very areas on which compromises were struck, 
consensus solidified, or political interests reached equilibrium.67 
In short, Congress will realize little advantage by suspending the ef-
fective date of amended Rule 11 for an additional year. Indeed, mounting 
political pressure, to which Congress has few responses, will only intensi-
fy. 68 Therefore, Congress may prefer not to delay the inevitable, but to 
58. See id. 
59. See S. 1382, 103d Cong., !st Sess. (1993); H.R. 2979. 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). 
60. See supra text accompanying notes 32-38. 
61. See FED. R. Clv. P. 1 l(a)-(b). 
62. See Tobias, supra note 6, at 1791. See generally Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of 
Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983) (suggesting the difficulty of writing and applying precise 
rules). 
63. See FED. R. Clv. P. I l(b)(2); Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 28 U.S.C. app. (1988); Tobias, supra note 
6, at 1781; Tobias, supra note 34, at 196-201. 
64. See FED. R. Clv. P. I l(c); Tobias, supra note 34, at 209-14. 
65. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text. 
66. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text. 
67. See supra text accompanying notes 29-38, 56-59. 
68. See S. 1382, 103d Cong., !st Sess. (1993) (calling for the enactment of a new Rule 11); H.R. 
1994] THE TRANSMITTAL LETTER TRANSI.ATED 137 
bite the political bullet now. Of course, 1994 is an election year. 
The truth regarding many of the above propositions relating to Rule 
11 may well lie somewhere in the middle.69 For instance, the rule revi-
sors substantially reduced the incentives for invoking Rule 11 by prescrib-
ing safe harbors from sanctions,70 by permitting judges to exercise discre-
tion in deciding whether to sanction, and by granting judicial discretion to 
decide what type of sanction to impose when judges find Rule 11 viola-
tions.71 The Advisory Committee concomitantly omitted several onerous 
requirements from the preliminary proposed Rule 11 draft, such as the 
continuing duty which would have demanded that lawyers and parties 
meticulously track small fragments of papers throughout litigation and that 
they withdraw those papers when the papers became untenable.72 The re-
visors decreased incentives for using Rule 11 and the Advisory Committee 
deleted these burdensome strictures despite the lingering concerns about 
deterring groundless lawsuits which Justice Scalia so forcefully express-
es.13 
Nevertheless, the rule revisors simultaneously employed terminology, 
such as "nonfrivolous" and "appropriate sanctions,"74 which will inexora-
bly engender inconsistent application and satellite litigation.75 The revi-
sors correspondingly retained certain incentives for seeking sanctions.76 
For example, the amended Rule authorizes judges to award parties who 
pursue Rule 11 motions the costs of prevailing and to levy sanctions of 
attorneys' fees in certain situations. 77 
In the final analysis, the 1993 Rule may not be perfect, but the 1993 
revision substantially improves the 1983 version,78 and is much clearer 
and fairer than the Advisory Committee's preliminary draft.79 Moreover, 
the 1993 Rule is considerably better than could be expected given the 
significant restraints imposed upon the rule revision entities. These re-
straints include the need to accommodate the various interests, such as the 
2979, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (same). 
69. Compare supra text accompanying notes 32-38 (discussing the Advisory Committee's view) 
with supra text accompanying notes 39-49 (discussing Justice Scalia's view). 
70. See FED. R. CIV. P. ll(c); Tobias, supra note 6, at 1784-85. 
71. See FED. R. C1v. P. ll(c); Tobias, supra note 6, at 1783-88. 
72. See Tobias, Reconsidering, supra note 9, at 866-71; Tobias, supra note 34, at 192-96; supra 
text accompanying note 24. 
73. See supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text. 
74. FED. R. CIV. P. ll(a)-(b). 
75. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text. 
76. Tobias, supra note 6, at 1788. 
77. See FED. R. C1v: P. ll(c); Tobias, supra note 6, at 1787-88 (discussing the Advisory 
Committee's efforts to reduce some incentives to seek sanctions and leave others intact). 
78. See Tobias, supra note 6, at 1776-77. 
79. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text. 
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federal judiciary and diverse elements of the bar, affected by the amend-
ment. so 
Perhaps the most accurate explanation for the revisors' action on Rule 
11 is that many federal judges apparently concluded that the 1983 Rule 
had achieved as much as it could accomplishs 1 by encouraging counsel 
and litigants to perform reasonable prefiling inquiries and by discouraging 
the presentation of frivolous papers.s2 The revision entities may have con-
comitantly determined that Rule 11 's vigorous enforcement was no longer 
worth the expenditure of scarce time, money, and energy of courts, law-
yers, and parties, for instance, to resolve satellite litigation which the rule 
necessitates.s3 Essential as well to the Rule 26 revision was the percep-
tion among judges, practitioners, and parties that discovery has now be-
come the bete noire of civil litigation84 and that discovery is in greater 
need of reform and holds more promise for real improvement than Rule 
11.ss 
2. Automatic Disclosure 
The process of revising Rule 26 to prescribe automatic disclosures6 
was as ironic as the Rule 11 amendment process.s7 The Advisory Com-
mittee seemed to forget the recent, unfortunate experience with the 1983 
revision of Rule 11. Although the Advisory Committee possessed little 
empirical data on the operation of the 1938 version of Rule 11, the Com-
mittee changed the provision fundamentally and that 1983 amendment has 
become the most controversial revision ever adopted.88 
Notwithstanding extremely limited experimentation with, much less 
evaluation of, automatic disclosure,89 the Advisory Committee published 
a 1991 preliminary draft proposal which could have substantially modified 
80. See generally CALL FOR COMMENTS, supra note 27 (requesting criticism of Rule 11 from 
affected members of the legal community and the public); supra text accompanying note 67 (dis-
cussing the balancing of interests in adopting new Rule 11 language). 
81. See supra text accompanying note 52. 
82. See FED. R. C1v. P. 11 advisory committee's note (stating that the 1993 rule revision is in-
tended to remedy problems stemming from sanctions imposed based on the 1983 amendment while 
maintaining high conduct and pleading standards). 
83. See Carl Tobias, Collision Course in Federal Ch'il Discovery, 145 F.R.D. 139, 142 (1993). 
84. See Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in Discovery-The Rush to Refonn. 27 GA. L. 
REV. I. 2-3 (1992) (discussing discovery reform as the focus of judicial reform efforts). 
85. See id. at 2; Tobias. supra note 83, at 140. 
86. See infra text accompanying note 91 (describing automatic disclosure). 
87. See Bell et al.. supra note 84, at 3-4; Tobias, supra note 83, at 141-42. See generally Winter. 
supra note 7, at 263, 264-74 (supporting reform and discussing proposed amendment). 
88. See Burbank, supra note 14, at 1927-28; supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
89. Only three federal districts had experimented with the procedure. Bell et al.. supra note 84, at 
17-18; see Mullenix, supra note 5, at 813-21. 
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the discovery process.90 That draft would have required plaintiffs and 
defendants to disclose before discovery considerable information which 
was "likely to bear significantly on any claim or defense."91 Few federal 
districts had tested automatic disclosure92 and two of the procedure's ear-
ly advocates had previously urged that a national rule be adopted only 
after widespread experimentation.93 Moreover, passage of the Civil Jus-
tice Reform Act of 1990 (CJRA) evidenced Congress' belief that testing 
should precede major change.94 
No formal proposal in the fifty-five year history of the Federal Rules 
has provoked so much vociferous criticism from such a broad spectrum of 
practitioners and parties who participate in the civil justice system.95 The 
rule revisors received a veritable flood of written opposition during the 
six-month comment period and listened to practically universal criticism 
during public hearings in Los Angeles and Atlanta.96 At the conclusion of 
the Atlanta session, the Advisory Committee responded to this public 
input by abandoning the automatic disclosure proposal in apparent defer-
ence to numerous districts' experimentation with the procedure under the 
CJRA.97 For a short time, therefore, the Advisory Committee seemed to 
think that the controversial measure's national imposition was less advis-
able than selective, local testing of the automatic disclosure concept.98 
90. See PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 10, at 87-99. 
91. See id. at 87-88; infra note 102 and accompanying text. 
92. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
93. See Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals 
for Change, 31 VAND. L. REv. 1295, 1361 (1978) (acknowledging the need for experimentation); 
William W Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, the Adversary Process, and Disc~very Reform, 50 U. Pm. 
L. REV. 703, 723 (1989) (suggesting national prescription of his disclosure proposal only after a suc-
cessful "trial period"). Both of these articles influenced the Advisory Committee's deliberations. Bell 
et al., supra note 84, at 40. 
94. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 104-105, 104 Stat. 5089, 
5097-98 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 471 (Supp. V 1993)) (affording guidance to district 
courts in formulating experimental programs and prescribing experimentation with discovery reform). 
See generally Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform and the Balkanization of Federal Civil Procedure, 24 
ARIZ. ST. LJ. 1393, 1393, 1402-22 (1992) (discussing the Civil Justice Reform Act and its implemen-
tation). 
95. Dissenting Statement of Justice Scalia, reprinted in AMENDMENTS, supra note 2, at 512; Bell 
et al., supra note 84, at 28-32; Ann Pelham, Forcing Litigants to Share, LEGAL TIMES, May 3, 1993, 
at 1. 
96. See Bell et al., supra note 84, at 28-32; Tobias, supra note 83, at 141. 
97. See Bell et al., supra note 84, at 34-35; Winter, supra note 7, at 268; Randall Sambom, U.S. 
CM/ Procedure Revisited, NAT'L LJ., May 4, 1992, at l, available in WESTLAW, NU Database. 
Considerable experimentation with automatic disclosure will continue, subject to evaluation by the 
Judicial Conference, which will report to Congress on the effort by December 31, 1996. See Judicial 
Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 105(c), 104 Stat. 5089, 5098 (codified as amended 
at 28 U.S.C. § 471(Supp.V1993)) (prescribing Dec. 31, 1995 reporting date); Judicial Amendments 
Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-420, § 4, 108 Stat. 4343, 4345 (1994). 
98. See Bell et al., supra note 84, at 34-35; Sambom, supra note 97, at I. 
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The Advisory Committee briefly sustained its apparent change of heart 
because the Committee reversed course again six weeks later without 
additional public comment or explanation.99 Half of the Advisory Com-
mittee convinced the remainder to reconsider, 100 at the instigation of Sec-
ond Circuit Judge Ralph K. Winter, a persuasive proponent of automatic 
disclosure. 101 In the April 1992 Advisory Committee meeting, the Com-
mittee members revitalized the automatic disclosure proposal, imposing 
the core requirement that litigants disclose "discoverable information rele-
vant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings."102 
Justice Scalia suggests that the Advisory Committee apparently found 
the CJRA' s experimentation schedule too protracted, "preferring instead to 
subject the entire federal judicial system at once to an extreme, costly, and 
essentially untested revision of a major component of civil litigation."103 
The Advisory Committee couched in principled terms its decision to modi-
fy course twice during a six-week period. Members claimed that discovery 
was operating ineffectively, 104 that maintenance of the status quo was 
unsatisfactory, 105 and that the legal profession's self-interest prevented it 
from instituting constructive change. 106 For instance, Winter perceptively 
stated at the April meeting that attorneys will resist discovery reform as 
long as they bill by the hour. 107 
However, the Advisory Committee seemed to appreciate that the three-
year time frame for amending rules which the new revision process pre-
scribed meant that its failure to require automatic disclosure would essen-
tially postpone judicially-controlled reform of discovery until the late 
1990s.108 Some observers even characterized the reversal as a desperate 
99. Bell et al., supra note 84, at 35. 
100. Ann Pelham, Panel Flips, OKs Discoioery Reform, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 20, 1992, at 6; 
Samborn, supra note 97, at I. 
101. See generally Winter, supra note 7, at 274-78 (arguing for discovery reform). 
102. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(l); see Bell et al., supra note 84, at 35-39; PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, 
supra note 32, at 517-18 & n.3 (stating that these changes in the revised proposal "do not significantly 
expand the extent of change between current rules and the published proposals" and do not require 
additional comment). Winter, however, suggests that the revised proposal was intended to be respon-
sive to some critics' "legitimate concerns." Winter, supra note 7, at 269. 
103. See Dissenting Statement of Justice Scalia, reprillfed in AMENDMENTS, supra note 2, at 512. 
104. Bell et al., supra note 84, at 35-39. 
105. Pelham, supra note 100, at 6; see Randall Samborn, Derailing the Rules, NAT'L L.J., May 24, 
1993, at 1, available in WESTLAW, NLJ Database. 
106. Pelham, supra note 95, at 20; Samborn, supra note 105. at I. The last observation illuminates 
another irony. Virtually all segments of the organized bar seemed to oppose the disclosure proposal 
and to agree that many problems accompany modern discovery. See, e.g., Bell et al., supra note 84, at 
2-3 (criticizing the present system); Pelham, supra note 95, at 1, 20 (opposing discovery changes). 
107. Pelham, supra note JOO, at 6; Samborn. supra note 97, at 12; see also Winter, supra note 7. 
at 277 (observing that the interests of attorneys who bill by the hour conflict with the interests of their 
clients on the issue of having less discovery). 
108. Samborn, supra note 97, at I. 
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attempt by the Advisory Committee to preserve the judiciary's flagging 
procedural influence, which has been eroded by both congressional re-
forms and executive branch initiatives.109 
The difficulty of definitively· ascertaining whether any of the automatic 
disclosure procedures will prove effective and if so, which, obviously 
complicates the debate over automatic disclosure. Very few of the consid-
erable number of districts which have been experimenting with disclo-
sure110 have employed provisions like the one th;it the Court is transmit-
ting.111 Many districts modeled their procedures instead on the Advisory 
Committee's preliminary draft automatic disclosure procedure.112 Even 
these district courts have not tested, much less assessed, the automatic dis-
covery mechanism for a period sufficient to yield conclusive determina-
tions regarding its efficacy .113 
Anecdotal evidence indicates that a number of Early Implementation 
District Courts (EIDCs), and other court~, experimenting with automatic 
disclosure have encountered minimal difficulty implementing the mea-
sure.114 The procedure apparently operates quite well in some contexts, 
particularly when the litigation is relatively simple or the disclosure is 
very general.115 Unfortunately, discovery poses the greatest problems and 
requires the most effective reform in complex lawsuits with national rami-
fications, such as products liability cases, and when litigants need particu-
larized information.116 
Additional anecdotal material suggests that, as practitioners acquire 
experience with automatic disclosure, they become less critical of the 
concept.117 In other words, familiarity does not breed contempt. The 
principal explanation for this phenomenon seems to be that, while attor-
109. Id.; see Exec. Order No. 12,778, 3 C.F.R. 359 (1991), reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519 (Supp. V 
1993). See generally Carl Tobias, Executfre Branch CM/ Justice Reform, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1521, 
1544-58 (1993) (discussing executive initiatives); Tobias, supra note 94 (discussing congressional 
reforms). 
110. Tobias, supra note 83, at 144. 
111. See supra notes 91, 102 and accompanying text. 
112. See Tobias, supra note 83, at 144-45; supra notes 91, 102 and accompanying text. 
113. Most of the Early Implementation District Courts (EIDCs) under the CJRA first instituted 
automatic disclosure in or after 1992, and few have rigorously evaluated its efficacy. See Tobias, supra 
note 83, at 144-45; Samborn, supra note 97, at I. 
114. These courts include the Northern District of California and the Districts of Arizona, Massa-
chusetts, and Montana. This evidence is derived from conversations with numerous individuals who 
are familiar with civil justice reform in those districts. See also Samborn, supra note 97, at 1; supra 
notes 112-13 and accompanying text. 
115. See Carl Tobias, More on Federal Civil Justice Refonn in Montana, 54 MONT. L. REV. 357, 
363 (1993); supra note 114. 
116. See Bell et al., supra note 84, at 39-44; Winter, supra note 7, at 268; supra note 114. 
117. See supra note 114. See generally Samborn, supra note 105, at l (providing practitioners' 
views, many of them positive, on automatic disclosure). 
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neys resist any procedural change, once attorneys attempt to satisfy a 
particular stricture imposed they have little difficulty complying. More 
specifically, numerous practitioners reportedly find that automatic disclo-
sure simply requires attorneys and their clients to participate in certain 
activities, especially document retrieval and labeling, at an earlier juncture 
in litigation. 118 
Equally respected authorities have declared with similar assurance that 
the disclosure proposal transmitted will clearly work, or will certainly 
prove inefficacious. Former Judge Griffin B. Bell, who compiled an excel-
lent record of service on the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit before President Jimmy Carter appointed him attorney general, has 
persuasively argued that the proposal will be ineffective. 119 For example, 
Bell contended that the vagueness of the automatic disclosure proposal 
would foster greater motion practice and promote overproduction while 
increasing expense. 120 Justice Scalia, in dissenting from the Court's trans-
mittal of the revision, subscribes to several of Bell's ideas and articulates 
additional convincing propositions. 121 Most importantly, Justice Scalia 
suggests that the disclosure amendment "adds a further layer of discov-
ery"122 and "does not fit comfortably within the American judicial sys-
tem, which relies on adversarial litigation to develop the facts before a 
neutral decisionmaker."123 
By contrast, Senior Judge William Schwarzer124 has also argued just 
as persuasively that the discovery revision will be efficacious. 125 
Schwarzer evaluated and convincingly criticized the five major precepts 
which Bell enunciated in support of his contention that the revision is 
flawed. 126 For instance, Schwarzer showed that Bell's speculation about 
the revision enhancing expense was premised on unfounded notions and 
on a "somewhat myopic view of the meaning and operation of the 
rule."127 Winter made an equally strong case for the amendment's effec-
118. See supra note 114. 
119. Bell et al., supra note 84, at 4. 
120. Id. at 41-46. Others, considerably less eminent than Bell, have agreed. See, e.g .• Tobias. su-
pra note 83. at 142-43. 
121. Dissenting Statement of Justice Scalia, reprinted in AMENDMENTS, supra note 2. at 510-12. 
122. Id. at 510. 
123. Id. at 511. 
124. Schwarzer rendered distinguished service as a judge of the United States District Court for 
the Northern District of California and has been a prolific. frequently-cited writer on civil procedure. 
Bell et al., supra note 84, at 17. Schwarzer was also named Director of the Federal Judicial Center on 
March 24. 1990. Id. 
125. See William W Schwarzer, In Defense of "Awomatic Disclosure in Disco1•ery," 27 GA. L. 
REV. 655, 664 (1993). 
126. See id. at 656-64. 
127. Id. at 663; accord Bell et al., supra note 84, at 44-46. 
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tiveness by claiming, for example, that disclosure will combat certain 
economic incentives to participate in excessive discovery .128 
The Supreme Court transmits the automatic disclosure revision without 
change,129 although three Justices dissent from the transmittal and other 
members of the Court express reservations about the transmittal.130 A 
majority of the Justices believe that the amendment is sufficiently work-
able, the core idea embodied in automatic disclosure is sufficiently worth-
while, and the need to revamp discovery is so important that adoption of 
the automatic disclosure revision is warranted.131 · 
If national application of automatic disclosure troubles Congress, it 
could rely on the CJRA, which affords district courts a valuable vehicle 
for testing different approaches to disclosure.132 Congress might refine 
experimentation by prescribing testing with several disclosure regimes that 
seem most promising in a manageable number of federal districts.133 In 
addition to all of the usual difficulties, such as temporal restraints, which 
ordinarily plague congressional efforts to rewrite the transmitted amend-
ments, Congress may currently lack sufficient knowledge about the effica-
cy of various disclosure measures to select one for nationwide 
implementation.134 
Perhaps the consummate irony is that a congressional decision to omit 
the provision for automatic disclosure would have little practical effect. 
Most of the thirty-four EIDCs have already adopted some type of disclo-
sure procedure135 and a number of the remaining districts have prescribed 
the technique, or will provide for automatic disclosure, under the 
CJRA.136 Therefore, a significant percentage of the ninety-four districts 
128. See Winter, supra note 7, at 265-73, 276-77. 
129. Compare PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 32, at 606-27 (including amendments as pro-
posed to the Supreme Court) with AMENDMENTS TO TIIE FED. RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, reprinted 
in 146 F.R.D. 401, 403-04, 431-47 (1993) (including the amendments transmitted to Congress by the 
Supreme Court). 
130. See Statement of Justice White, reprinted in AMENDMENTS, supra note 2, at 501; Dissenting 
Statement of Justice Scalia, reprinted in AMENDMENTS, supra note 2, at 507 (joining the dissent in full 
is Justice Thomas with Justice Souter joining in part). 
131. See Transmittal Letter, supra note 2 (transmitting the amendments to Congress). But see infra 
note 146 and accompanying text (suggesting that the Supreme Court's language in the transmittal letter 
indicated that the Court approved of the revision in form, but not necessarily in substance). 
132. See supra note 94 and accompanying text 
133. See Carl Tobias, In Defense of Experimentation with Automatic Disclosure, 27 GA. L. REV. 
665, 666-71 (1993). 
134. See supra note 114. Seven months is simply insufficient time for a busy Congress to rewrite 
complex amendments. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (1988) "(providing that Congress has seven months to 
make changes to the amendments); cf. supra text accompanying notes 59-66 (discussing congressional 
efforts to consider Rule 11 ). 
135. Tobias, supra note 83, at 144-45. 
136. As io the remaining districts, I premise this assertion on personal conversations with numer-
ous individuals involved in civil justice reform in those districts. 
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will implement disclosure mechanisms that are inconsistent with the cur-
rent Federal Rules and with procedures in other districts. 137 
These conflicts will complicate participation in federal civil litigation 
for attorneys and parties, such as government lawyers and public interest 
organizations, which litigate in multiple districts. 138 Such conflicts will 
also test judges' and practitioners' tolerance for inconsistency. Indeed, the 
CJRA Advisory Group for the Eastern District of New York urged that the 
rule revisors observe a "three-year moratorium on affected national rules 
so that each district can have a fair opportunity to assess reforms at the 
local level." 139 Nonetheless, as courts, counsel, and parties become ac-
customed to the disclosure concept in specific districts, 140 and as studies 
evaluate the procedure's efficacy, the resulting familiarity and documenta-
tion will probably indicate that one form of disclosure is superior, thereby 
facilitating the promulgation of a uniform, national discovery provision by 
the year 2000. 141 
Ill. FINAL THOUGHTS 
The Court would not presume to offer suggestions regarding rule 
revision for several reasons as theoretical as concerns about maintaining 
the separation of powers and even about appearing to advise a separate 
branch of the federal government. 142 These factors have peculiar applica-
bility today. Indeed, the federal judiciary is acutely sensitive to the deli-
cate, and even deteriorating nature of interbranch relationships, especially 
in the important area of court rulemaking, and is carefully cultivating 
those relations. 143 
137. See Lauren Robel. Fractured Procedure: The Civil Justice Refonn Act of 1990, 46 STAN. L. 
REV. 1447, 1452-54 (1994) (analyzing the districts' authority to adopt inconsistent procedures); 
Tobias, supra note 83, at 144-45 (same). See generally Linda S. Mullenix, Unconstitutional 
Rulemaking: The Civil Justice Refonn Act and Separation of Powers, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1283 (1993) 
(analyzing Congress' authority to adopt CJRA). 
138. See generally Tobias, supra note 83 (delineating conflict between CJRA reforms and the new 
Rule 26). 
139. Letter from Edwin J. Wesely, Chair, Advisory Group for the Eastern District of New York. to 
Robert Keeton, Chair, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the 
United States (Feb. 3, 1992) (on file with author); see also Samborn, supra note 105, at I (suggesting 
coincidence between CJRA changes and the effective date of new Rule 26). See generally Stephen B. 
Burbank. Ignorance and Procedural law Refom1: A Call for a Moratorium. 59 BROOK. L. REV. 841, 
842 (1993) (calling for a moratorium on changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
140. See supra notes 110-18 and accompanying text. 
141. See supra text accompanying notes 110-18 (discussing the increased implementation of auto-
matic disclosure in some districts pursuant to the CJRA). 
142. See Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Refonnation in Procedural Justice, 77 MINN. L. REV. 
375, 379-82 (1992). 
143. See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 94, at 1425-26; Don J. DcBenedictis, Tight Budget Squee:es 
Courts. 78 A.B.A. J., Dec. 1992, at 22-23 (recounting the relationship between Congress and the ju-
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Additional reasons are as pragmatic as the Justices' decreasingly active 
participation in the amendment process, which is consistent with the rela-
tive passivity that spans the last three decades.144 The Court's decision to 
transmit all of the revisors' proposals without change is a telling reminder 
that the Justices play an extremely circumscribed role in modem rule revi-
sion.145 Equally revealing is the cover letter's disclaimer that, "[w]hile 
the Court is satisfied that the required procedures have been observed, this 
transmittal does not necessarily indicate that the Court itself would have 
proposed these amendments in the form submitted."146 Although the Jus-
tices are obviously reluctant to offer anything which might be character-
ized as advice, 147 they are also cognizant that the present is a critical mo-
ment in the history of civil rules revision. This timing compels the Court 
to formulate a few significant questions which Congress should address 
when considering the package of transmitted amendments and to provide 
some final thoughts on the amendments. 
Perhaps the crucial queries are how Congress, having opened the 
national rule revision process, can maximize the benefits and minimize the 
disadvantages of increased public participation in that process148 while 
continuing to capitalize on the finest aspects of a process that has served 
the federal courts, Congress, and the public remarkably well during the 
last half-century .149 For example, the rule revision entities have accumu-
lated a wealth of expertise, particularly regarding the complexities and 
subtleties of federal civil practice, and have applied this expertise to many 
difficult civil procedure problems. They have studied developments in 
civil litigation, collected, analyzed, and synthesized relevant data, and 
drafted proposals for improvements that responded to the needs of all civil 
justice system participants.150 The 1993 revisions represent the handi-
work of the Advisory Committee, the Standing Committee, the Judicial 
diciary in working out the 1993 judiciary budget). See generally Mullenix, supra note 142, at 379 
(discussing the implications of the Civil Justice Reform Act on distribution of procedural rulemaking 
power). 
144. A quintessential articulation of this is Justice White's separate statement, which accompanied 
the package transmitted. See Statement of Justice White, reprillted in AMENDMENTS, supra note 2. at 
506 (observing that the Court's role has become more limited); Amendments to Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, 374 U.S. 861, 865-70 (1963) (statement of Black, J. and Douglas, J.) (opposing submission of 
rules and remarking on the Court's limited role). See generally WINIFRED R. BROWN, FEDERAL JUDI-
CIAL CTR., FEDERAL RULEMAKING: PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES 70-79 (1981) (discussing the extent 
and advisability of the Supreme Court's role in promulgating various federal rules). 
145. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
146. See supra note 2 and accompanying text .. 
147. See supra text accompanying note 2. 
148. See 28 U.S.C. § 2073(c) (1988); infra notes 146-53, 155 and accompanying text. 
149. See Tobias, supra note 94, at 1426. 
150. See Tobias, supra note 34, at 176-87 (detailing the work of the rule revision entities). 
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Conference, and the Court, 151 all of which focused their expertise on the 
important complications of modern procedure and vigorously toiled for 
three years to develop the most efficacious amendments. 
The 1993 revisions are the fruits of the initial major experiment with 
the procedures governing national rule amendment that Congress pre-
scribed in 1988. 152 The new process, which Congress intended to im-
prove rule revision by opening the process to greater public scrutiny, 
yielded mixed results. 153 Numerous public comments on the proposed 
amendments were of high quality. Considerable public input persuaded the 
rule revisors to reexamine significant issues and even to modify a few 
proposals, such as those governing Rule 11 and automatic disclosure. 154 
Some of the public participation was less constructive, however. A number 
of contributions were inaccurate, or were based on minimal empirical data, 
while certain submissions were duplicative. 155 This material may have 
required that the revisors devote time and energy to ascertaining the rel-
evance of input that ultimately was not useful. 
The rule revision entities did not always maximize the benefits and 
minimize the disadvantages of public participation by, for instance, using 
the cogent comments and ignoring the inaccurate contributions. 156 More-
over, political factors, reflected in certain submissions, might have unduly 
influenced the revisors to alter several proposals, namely Rule 11. 157 By 
comparison, additional political considerations, and even convincing input, 
151. Cf supra note 54 and accompanying text (describing participants in Rule 11 adoption). 
152. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2075, 2077 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
153. See 28 U.S.C. § 2073(c)(l) (1988) (mandating that the Advisory Committee provide notice of 
meetings and that Committee proceedings be open to the public, with limited exceptions). 
154. See, e.g., Letter from Judge Sam C. Pointer, Jr., Chairman, Advisory Committee. to Judge 
Robert E. Keeton, Chairman, Standing Committee, Attach. B (May I, 1992), reprinted in 
AMENDMENTS, supra note 2, at 523-24 (indicating that the Advisory Committee changed the Rule 11 
draft in response to public input); supra notes 95-102 and accompanying text (indicating that the Ad-
visory Committee changed the automatic disclosure draft in response to public input). 
155. These ideas are primarily premised on my review of the written comments of Rule 11 sub-
mitted throughout the revision process. See Tobias, Reconsidering, supra note 9, at 862-63. The char-
acteristics of public input here resemble those attributed to public participation in administrative agen-
cy proceedings. Compare Tobias, supra note 34, at 176-87 (discussing the committee's process of 
revising Rule 11, including Call for Comments) with Barry B. Boyer, Funding Public Participation in 
Agency Proceedings: The Federal Trade Commission fa:perience, 70 GEO. L.J. 51, 128-29, 139-40 
(1981) (evaluating the appearance of, and compensation for, representatives of consumer interests at 
FTC rulemaking hearings) and Carl W. Tobias, Of Public Funds and Public Participation: Resofring 
the Issue of Agency Authority to Reimburse Public Participants in Administrative Proceedings. 82 
COLUM. L. REV. 906. 907-09, 945-47 (1982) (discussing generally the problem of encouraging public 
input in administrative proceedings and deficiencies associated with compensating participants). This 
was predictable, as the new revision process is analogous to notice and comment rulemaking. See 28 
U.S.C. § 2073(c) (1988) (providing for public hearings preceded by "sufficient notice"). 
156. See supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
157. See supra notes 28-33, 154 and accompanying text; supra text accompanying notes 67-68. 
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apparently had little effect on the revisors' treatment of other proposals, 
particularly automatic disclosure.158 
Increased openness in the process exposed the rule revision entities to 
greater political pressure. For example, many attorneys and parties inter-
ested in proposed amendments sent numerous overnight packages, includ-
ing eleventh-hour pleas for revisions in various provisions, to Judge Rob-
ert Keeton, the Standing Committee Chair.159 Supplicants were not bash-
ful about communicating their views to Court members either, although 
the Justices lack any formal procedure for reviewing such communica-
tions.160 
Congress will soon be intensively lobbied by attorneys, litigants, and 
additional affected interests who did not secure all that they .wanted in the 
rule amendment process.161 Those participants who failed to persuade the 
rule revisors will inevitably bring their case to Congress. If in seven 
months, Congress freely modifies proposals which the revisors spent three 
years developing, the rule revision process will be undermined and per-
haps eviscerated. If Congress substantially changes the Rule 11 and auto-
matic disclosure revisions, the two components of the 1993 package that 
are integral to modem civil litigation, Congress could seriously jeopardize 
the continued vitality of, and even sound the requiem for, national rule 
amendment. Perhaps the supreme irony of the 1988 congressional efforts 
to reform rule revision is that the first important test of the new revision 
procedures may effectively be the final one. 
158. See supra notes 95-102, 154-57 and accompanying text. Justice Scalia similarly considered 
much bar input on automatic disclosure as highly persuasive, even as he apparently discounted analo-
gous input on Rule 11. See Dissenting Statement of Justice Scalia, reprinted in AMENDMENTS, supra 
note 2, at 512-13; supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text. 
159. See, e.g., Walter Lucas, Bar Blasts Proposed Changes in Discovery, N.J. LJ., Mar. 2, 1992, 
at 4 (describing letter from New Jersey Bar President to rules committee); Letter from Arthur H. 
Bryant, Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, to Judge Robert E. Keeton (June 16, 1992) (on file with the 
Florida Law Review). · 
160. See Statement of Justice White, reprinted in AMENDMENTS, supra note 2, at 505 (observing 
that the letters Justice White received indicated the proposals did not please everyone but assuming 
that opposing views were properly aired at committee proceedings); Sambom, supra note 105, at 1 (re-
ferring to a February 1993 memorandum to the Supreme Court by former Solicitor General Erwin 
Griswold). 
161. See Mullenix, supra note 5, at 854-55. 
